Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 2

Issue 3

Article 2

January 1987

Nicaragua's Right to Self-Determination vis-à-vis United States
Foreign Policy Objectives
Gabriele Nicolaus Dupre

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
Dupre, Gabriele Nicolaus (1987) "Nicaragua's Right to Self-Determination vis-à-vis United States Foreign
Policy Objectives," Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 2: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Dupre: Nicaragua's Right to Self-Determination vis-à-vis United States F

NICARAGUA'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION VISA-VIS UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

I.
II.

III.

INTRODUCTION ....................................

263

C ONTEXT .........................................

264

A.

The Principle of Self-Determination...........

264

B.

Participants.................................

266

PROBLEM ............................................

269

IV . G OALS ...........................................

272

V.
VI.

T REND S ..........................................

274

APPRAISAL ...........................................

277

VII.

PROJECTIONS .....................................

279

VIII.

ALTERNATIVES ....................................

281

CONCLUSION ......................................

283

IX .

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nicaragua is a country of strategic importance in geopolitical
terms in the Western Hemisphere. Both the United States and the
Cuban/Russian alliance are vying for political influence in Nicaragua
with the ultimate aim of controlling the ideological outlook of its government. Tragically, the people of Nicaragua must bear the brunt of
this political tug-of-war. Violations of human rights, declared universal in the Charter of the United Nations,1 are occurring in that country in the name of freedom and democracy. The right of self-determination is one of these rights in the Charter,2 and it is the focus of this
paper. Nicaragua's right of self-determination will be examined in
the context of the country's historic and contemporary development
together with the United States government's ideological foreign policy design. This paper was completed in the first part of November
1987 at which time, primarily due to the Arias peace plan, new developments surrounding the Nicaragua conflict were the order of the
day.
1. U.N.
2. U.N.

CHARTER,
CHARTER,

Preamble.
art. 1, para. 2.
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CONTEXT

The Principle of Self-Determination

The principle of self-determination 3 has its origin in the mandate
system created after World War I. As a result of Germany's defeat,
the need arose to administer parts of the German colonial empire.
Among the victors of the war only the United States did not possess
colbnies. Thus, President Wilson strongly objected to annexation of
the former German colonies by any Allied country, and instead he
supported a system of self-government based on the idea of self-determination. However, at the Peace Conference in Versailles it
quickly became clear that the abstract principle of self-determination
presented enormous difficulties concerning implementation.
The first hurdle at the conference was the definition of "self"
which was to "determine" the desired form of government. The main
questions were how to set boundaries, and then how to resolve the
conflicting claims to "self" within a given area.3 In light of these and
numerous other logistical obstacles the idea of self-determination had
to give way to a more practical compromise with the system of mandates.' Under the mandate arrangement, administrating states would
act as mandatories on behalf of a League of Nations for the wellbeing of the inhabitants of each former colony.7 The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations incorporated the mandate system." Once abandoned, the principle of self-determination would not be easily resurrected. Turning to
the case of South West Africa, one sees how difficult the process of
moving from mandate to self-determination can be.
Under the Treaty of Versailles the colony of South West Africa,
today Namibia, was mandated to the Union of South Africa, which in
turn became accountable to the Council of the League of Nations.,
Until the end of World War II, South Africa remained the legitimate
mandatory of this region. Then, in 1945 the United Nations was
formed, 10 and the U.N. Charter contained no specific provision for
3. Self-determination: International Law, Decision by the population of a territorial unit
as to its future political status. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1041 (8th ed. 1981).
4. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, SOUTH WEST AFRICA ADVISORY OPINION 1971, A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 8 (1972) [hereinafter ADVISORY
OPINION]. See also M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW DocTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1982. [hereinafter POMERANCE].
5. See generally, POMERANCE, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
8. ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 2, at 9.
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 13. See also THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
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the continuation of the established mandate system.1 However,
Chapter XI, Article 73 of the Charter spoke of a "sacred trust," i.e., a
trusteeship, and outlined the responsibilities of administering states
towards territories in trust. These responsibilites included the obligation "to develop self-government, [and] to take due account of the
political aspiration of the people .

. . .""

Additionally, the Charter's

opening chapter stated the purposes and principles of the U.N. were
"to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . .

.,,"

When the League of Nations ceased to exist legally in April 1946,
South Africa submitted a proposal to the U.N. General Assembly to
incorporate South West Africa into South Africa's own territory. 4
The General Assembly, however, requested a trusteeship arrangement instead. More specifically, it was concluded that the inhabitants
had not yet reached a stage of development which would enable them
to settle on a system of government, or in other words, fulfill the goal
of self-determination. 15 In the following years different African states
pressed repeatedly for a solution to the South West Africa issue because South Africa had never submitted a trusteeship request. 16 Indicating its concern, the U.N. General Assembly passed the strongly
worded Resolution 1514 in 1960, proclaiming in part: "[a]ll peoples
have the right to self-determination, by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."' 7 South Africa continued to
disregard U.N. directives and was officially charged with denying the
inhabitants of South West Africa any progress towards self-determination.' 8 Through the years the U.N. has consistently called on South
Africa to implement procedures for the independence of the region.
To this day, however, Namibia is still being governed by South
Africa.' 9
The principle of self-determination has been interpreted by the
TION, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 3 (U.S.G.P.O. Washington,
DOCUMENTS].
11. ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 2, at 14.
12. U.N. CHARTER, art. 73.

D.C. 1946) [hereinafter

SELECTED

13.

Id.

14.

ADVISORY OPINION, supra note

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 26.

18.

ADVISORY OPINION, supra note 2, at 32. A Special Committee report covering possible

POMERANCE,

2, at 18.

supra note 2, at 11.

independence to colonial people was the focus of the debate on September 23, 1966. Id.
19. 23 U.N. CHRON. 40 (1986). The Secretary General strongly urged South Africa to comply with U.N. demands of finally implementing solutions for the Namibia conflict. Id. See also
S.C. Res. 435, 29 Sept. 1978; S.C. Res. 439 13 Nov. 1978. When South Africa unilaterally conducted elections in Namibia, the Security Council declared them void. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

3

Florida
Journal ofINTERNATIONAL
International Law, Vol.
2, Iss.
3 [1987], Art. 2
FLORIDA
LAW
JOURNAL

[Vol. II

International Court of Justice (ICJ) 0 as prevailing even when state
structures appear to represent the choice of the people. In the Western Sahara case, 2 the court recognized that not only one but two
22
countries had sufficient legal claims to the Western Sahara region.
However, any such claims had to give way to the present express will
of the people of the Western Sahara Thus, under contemporary international law, self-determination is a basic, inalienable human right
embracing the precept of non-intervention.
The United States in 1823 declared the tenet of non-intervention.
In a message to Congress, President Monroe established the doctrine
that European nations were not to interfere in the internal affairs of
the Western Hemisphere, or more specifically, the Americas. 2' Yet,
the Monroe Doctrine from a Latin American vantage point has fallen
into disrepute, since it has regularly been invoked to justify United
States intervention in Latin America.2 In the political reality of the
1980's the application of the self-determination principle remains as
formidable as it was in the earlier colonial setting. The enduring
struggle surrounding the small country of Nicaragua illustrates the
inherent complexity when self-determination as an axiom of international law conflicts with the foreign policy goals of a superpower like
the United States.
B.

Participants

The political history of Nicaragua has been shaped by United
States intervention beginning as far back as 1912 when the United
States began maintaining a military presence in that country. 2 The
20. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A 1, cols. 2-3. The International Court of Justice (ICJ
or World Court) is an agency of the U.N. The court's headquarters are in the Hague, Netherlands. It was created as a forum for nations; individuals, therefore, may not sue or be sued. Id.
21. 1975 I.C.J. 4 (advisory opinion).
22. Id. at 19-20. See also 12 U.N. CHRON 28 (1975).
The Court has not found legalities of such a nature as might affect the application of
General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in
particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression
of the will of the peoples of the Territory.
Id.
23.
24.

1975 I.C.J. at 28.
Annual Message to Congress, AM State Papers, 5 Foreign Relations 250 (Dec. 2,

1823), reprinted in 6 J.

MOORE,

A

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

401 (1906) [hereinafter

Monroe Doctrine].
25. Carto, The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980's: International Law, UnilateralPolicy, or
Atavistic Anachronism?, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 203 (1981). As Carto points out, such
invocation was made to look after United States strategic, political and economic interests in
Latin America. Id. at 207.
26. The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domestic and International Influences, 15
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Nicaraguan elections of 1928 and 1932 which enabled the Somoza2 7
family to assume the presidency in Nicaragua were organized and supervised by the United States. " The Somozas, in the name of the
Liberal Party, maintained political power within Nicaragua's constitutional framework2 9 until the summer of 1979.0 Elections in Nicaragua during the Somoza regime were mere ratifications of candidates
chosen by the incumbent party and the United States government."1
Each of the three Somozas who ruled Nicaragua received United
States support to consolidate his power and maintain control over
the country.32 In return, Nicaragua proved to be a dependable ally of
the United States and displayed a favorable attitude towards North
American business ventures."3
In late 1977, the stability of the Somoza dictatorship was shaken
by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)3 4 which was
able to rally large segments of the society to its cause. 5 Disturbances
in Nicaragua escalated over the next two years until the unrest
culminated in the resignation of General Somoza in July 1979.36 The
sequence of events leading to Somoza's resignation were triggered by
a major earthquake in 1972 that nearly leveled Nicaragua's capital
city, Managua. When international relief poured into Managua in the
form of food, medicine, and financial aid, the Somoza family openly
hoarded most of the supplies.37 The apparent indifference of the
ASS'N. 3 (Winter 1985) [hereinafter LASA REPORT].
Anastasio Somoza Debayle was president of Nicaragua until July 1979.

LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES

27.

The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship was in large part a result of activities by two
grassroots movements. One of these was Catholic, the other Marxist-oriented. The older
of the two, the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) was founded in July
1961 by Carlos Fonesca, Silvio Mayorga and Tomas Borge, former members of the local
pro-Soviet Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN). For these young men, the old Communist
party was too Stalinist in organization and too subservient to the Soviet policy of 'peaceful co-existence', which in Latin America often meant acceptance of pro-United States
dictatorship. The founders of the FSLN were determined to create an authentically Nicaraguan revolutionary movement [with the objective to overthrow Anastasio Somoza, the

dictator].
T. WALKER, NICARAGUA: THE LAND OF SANDINO 40-41 (2d ed. 1986).
28. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional was founded in 1961 as a Castroite guerrilla
group named after Augusto Cesar Sandino, a prominent rebel during the United States occupation of the 1920s. Landau, The Way of the Sandinistas, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 21, 1986, at 22.
35. Id.
36. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 8. See also supra note 27.
37. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
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Somozas to the homeless and hungry people alienated the middle
class, which then joined in the revolution.3 8 The ensuing insurrection
was, on a per capita basis, one of the largest in Latin American history. 9 Since 1979 the FSLN, under the leadership of Daniel Ortega
Saavedra, 40 has been the dominant political force in Nicaragua.4" The
FSLN has proclaimed as its primary goals independence and social
justice.
When President Somoza left Nicaragua in 1979 for exile in
Miami, the United States lost a valuable longtime friend in Central
America. 3 By 1981 policymakers in Washington feared that United
States interests were jeopardized by the change of leadership in Nicaragua. One of the most outspoken politicians voicing concern was
Jeane Kirkpatrick, 4 who urged the incoming Reagan Administration
to focus attention on Soviet/Cuban expansion in Latin America.4 5
Charges were leveled at the Carter Administration for bringing down
the Somoza regime. 46 In support, the charges cited the Carter Administration's halting of United States-made weapons to Nicaragua because of human rights violations by Somoza's National Guard.4 1
Dr. Kirkpatrick strongly advocated a different foreign policy approach, one that would create a "psychological dependence" of strategically important Latin American countries.' 8 This was to be
achieved by providing the appropriate groups with "money, arms, logistical support and the services of counterinsurgency experts.' 49
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Daniel Ortega Saavedra, born in 1945, became active in the student protest movement. For a while, he was a law student but later became the leader of the underground in
Managua. He had been recruited into the FSLN around 1963, during all this time he remained
an active practicing Catholic. In 1967 Ortega was imprisoned for having taken part in the assassination of one Gonzalo Lacayo. After release from prison in 1974 he worked with his brother
Humberto Ortega in the formation of the Tercerista Insurrectional strategy. After the insurrection, he emerged as the chief international representative of the Nicaraguan government. He is
considered a pragmatist. D. NOLAN, FLSN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SANDINISTAS AND THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION 148 (1984).
41. See supra note 34.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Security and Latin America, 71 COMMENTARY 29 (Jan. 1981). Jeane
Kirkpatrick is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., and
she is Leavy University Professor of Government at Georgetown University.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 36.
47. Id. The Carter Administration's philosophy made it difficult for the Somoza regime to
use its usual tactics of repression in dealing with its opponents. When Somoza's National
Guard responded to FSLN violence with violence, the United States State Department accused
Somoza of having "radicalized the opposition." Id.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id.
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The Reagan Administration thus embarked on a realpolitik" that
sought to recapture the dominant power position the United States
had held for so many decades in Latin America, and in particular, in
Nicaragua. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was authorized to
arm and train Nicaraguan exiles (Contras) hostile to the Sandinistas
for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government in Managua.5 1 In the last six years, the United States has spent millions of
dollars on Contra support and has worked covertly and overtly to
install a pro-Western government in Nicaragua. 2
III.

PROBLEM

The political goals of the Nicaraguan government and the United
States government are dissimilar. While the Sandinistas want independence from outsiders for their people, the United States strives to
impose its own ideological imprimatur on the political system of Nicaragua. The leaders in Managua, true to their declared goals, have
implemented an administrative system that would facilitate the transition from a Somoza dictatorship to an egalitarian society. 3
One of the first steps undertaken was a National Literacy Crusade. 54 From March to August 1980, 400,000 people were taught basic reading and writing skills, lowering the country's illiteracy rate
from 50.4 percent to 20 percent.5 Literacy was seen as essential for
the citizenry to make meaningful choices in upcoming elections."
The Sandinista's reasoning is the same that the U.N. General Assembly expressed in 1946 when it turned down South Africa's bid to incorporate South West Africa into its territory.57
In order not to alienate various political factions and the Catholic
Church, the Sandinistas made an effort to govern in a non-ideological, pragmatic manner. However, most Sandinistas have always been
50. Realpolitik is defined as "politics based on practical and material factors rather than
on theoretical or ethical objectives." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 954 (8th ed. 1981)
(emphasis added).
51. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, 1983 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (97 Stat.) 1473. See also Explosion Over Nicaragua, TIME, Apr. 23,
1984, at 18.

52. 131 Cong. Rec. H 2335 (daily ed. April 23, 1985) (Who are the Contras?: "While the
'footsoldiers'of the FDN Army are largely peasants, the army is organized and commanded by
former National Guardsmen.") See generally L. CHRISTIAN, NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION IN THE
FAMILY 204-05 (1986).

53.

LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 5.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57.

ADVISORY OPINION,

supra note 4, at 19.
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ardently nationalistic and ideologically Marxist or Leninist. 8 On the
other hand, the United States-backed Contras are considered rightwing since the majority of the Contra leaders previously were officers
in Anastasio Somoza's National Guard.5 9 The undeclared war between the Contras and the Nicaraguan government has now lasted
for more than six years.60 According to the Sandinistas, the war up to
the end of 1986 has claimed 40,000 casualties, military and civilian on
both sides, with most of them under thirty years of age."
As a result of elections on November 4, 1984, the Sandinista government today exercises its rights under international law as the de
jure government of Nicaragua. There is little doubt, however, that
the Reagan Administration was successful in discrediting the election
results in the perception of most Americans by calling the elections a
sham. 2 Yet, a closer look at documentation presented by eminent,
reputable American scholars reveals a different picture. 3
Several months before the elections, the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua invited a delegation of the Latin American Studies
Association (LASA) to observe the upcoming event. 4 Fifteen members, all of them university professors from across the United States,
travelled to Nicaragua. They spent eight days touring the country listening, questioning and observing. They concluded that no irregularities took place either before or during the voting process." No harassment of the electorate, no pressure on opposition parties, no
unfairness of any kind was reported.6 This impression was confirmed
by a Canadian delegation,6 7 as well as a commission of the European
58.

See D.

59.

CHRISTIAN,

NOLAN,

supra note 40, at 140.

supra note 52, at 205-06.

60. See infra note 141, at 228-243.
61. 8 CENT. AM. UPDATE 37 (1987). "Casualties" include those persons killed, wounded
and kidnapped as a result of the undeclared war." Id.
62. 6 CENT. AM. UPDATE 25 (1984). The strong showing of the FSLN in the election was
not unexpected. Despite the efforts of the Reagan Administration to declare the election unrepresentative, 75 percent of the registered voters made it to the polls. Even though the campaign
had been unpleasant occassionally, international observers made the assessment that the election proceedings were fair. See also LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 16. In fact, so anxious
were Nicaraguans to exercise their right to vote that many of them got into lines at 4:00 a.m.
even though the polls did not open until 7:00 a.m. Id.
63. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 15-16.
64. Id. at 1. The 15 LASA members traveling to Nicaragua included inter alia: Wayne A.
Cornelius (Political Science, U. Cal.-San Diego); Michael E. Conroy (Economics, U. Tex.-Austin); Thomas Walker (Political Science, Ohio U.-Athens); Paul Doughty (Anthropology, U.
Fla.).
65. Id. at 15-18 & 24.
66. Id. There were eleven opposition parties registered at the time of elections, but only
six of them registered candidates. Of the six party contenders, three were considered to be to
the right and the other three to the left of the FSLN.
67. See Nicaragua, 6 CENT. AM. UPDATE 30 (1984). The Canadian Church and Human
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Parliament.6
The FSLN received sixty-seven percent of the votes with seventyfive percent of the electorate participating. The six opposition parties
shared in the remaining thirty-three percent of the votes.6 Daniel
Ortega became the elected president while a ninety-six person National Assembly was installed. 0 On assuming office in January 1985,
Nicaragua's new president announced a general amnesty for
"counter-revolutionaries", or, Contras.7 He also restated his eagerness to talk with the United States in an effort to normalize relations
7
between the two countries. 2
Within two weeks of the Nicaraguan elections LASA published a
thirty-five page report that was sent to every congressman in Washington. Additionally, every major newspaper received the report. 73
Yet, the American public has heard little if anything about this report and its underlying meaning. If one accepts the LASA report as
valid, and there is no reason not to, it follows that American activities in Nicaragua violate that country's sovereignty. In light of Nicaraguan history,74 it should come as no surprise that the United States
would want to participate actively in deciding who becomes president
in that country.
For many decades the United States played a central role in Nicaraguan elections.7 It is therefore understandable that the United
States would seek to maintain such a decisive position. However, in
the 1984 elections the majority of the Nicaraguan people exercised
their right to self-determination, and freely chose their representative
Rights Delegates stated: "There is no margin of doubt that, on historical, social and now electoral grounds, the Sandinista Front (FSLN) has emerged as the legitimate ruling party of Nicaragua. All important aspects of the electoral process were carefully observed or studied by the
delegation." Id.
68. Official Delegation of European Parliament Rep. to the Enlarged Bureau of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, Nov. 16, 1984, EUR. PARL. Doc. PE 93.990/BUR/Ann. I.
69. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 17.
70. 6 CENT. AM. UPDATE 40 (1985). See also LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 25. The
opposition parties will be represented by 36.5 percent of the National assembly seats. This
proportional representation system in the Nicaraguan national legislature maximizes the representation of the opposition parties. Id.
71. 6 CENT. AM. UPDATE 40 (1985).
72. Id.
73. Interview with Dr. Paul Doughty, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, Sept. 27, 1986. The report was sent to the Washington Post as well as
the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times. All three newspapers refused to publish any
portion of the report. To the best of Dr. Doughty's knowledge, only a small newspaper in Denver, Colorado published parts of the report. Id.
74. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 12, 13. See also LaFeber, Central America's Challenge to the U.S., N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, at E23, cols. 1-4. Theodore Roosevelt had described Latin American nations as "small bandit nests of a wicked and inefficient type." Id.
75. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 12, 13.
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government. International law requires that the United States acknowledge and respect the legitimacy of this choice. 6 Nevertheless,
the United States State Department refers to the Sandinista government as a dictatorship and has spent millions of American tax dollars
in an effort to overthrow it. 77 At the same time, the Sandinista gov-

ernment enjoys the support of the major democratic governments in
Latin America, as well as that of Canada and most of the European
democracies. 8 In fact, it was the Swedish Electoral College which
guided the election process when Nicaraguans exercised their right to
determine the political direction of their country.79
IV.

GoALs

From its inception the Sandinista government appears to have
moved towards the establishment of an egalitarian society. A massive
agrarian reform program settled 100,000 formerly destitute people on
land to farm and to participate productively in the country's economic development." Large land holdings, once belonging to the
Somozas and their friends, were broken up to make the redistribution possible.8 ' Of course, the new landowners are now staunch supporters of the government.
Free health care was provided in distant rural communities, a
large scale vaccination campaign against polio and measles was undertaken, and modern hospitals were built.8 2 Consequently, incidents
of malnutrition and infant mortality have decreased.88 Overall, the
government has raised the standard of living for the lower classes, in
spite of the 1.6 billion dollar foreign debt inherited from the Somoza
regime.8 "
76. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
77. Statement by E. Abrams, PermanentDictatorshipin Nicaragua?,U.S. Dept. of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Pub. No. 802; see also Lewis, By Hate Possessed, N.Y. Times, Mar.
24, 1986, at A19, cols. 1-3 (The Sandinista government is described as President Reagan's
"Moby Dick," with all its ramifications). But see supra note 53, at 4 and accompanying text.
78. M. Singer, Losing Central America, 82 CoMMENTARY 11 (July, 1986). See also
Manchester Guardian, July 6, 1986, at 1, cols 2-4. ". . .Nicaragua is in no way a threat to the
United States. It has held elections which were freer of violence and less spoiled by intimidation, and which offered a wider range of ideological choices than most elections in the region. It
has pledged not to accept foreign bases, either for nuclear or conventional weapons on its territory and has offered to sign a treaty with the United States to that effect. Its only danger to
Washington is that it sets an example of independence which has been lacking for decades in
the Central American isthmus." Id.
79. LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 21-22.
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 12.
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The changes that the Sandinistas have accomplished in the last
six years are vehicles for maximizing the human rights of the Nicaraguan people. The fundamental policies behind these general goals afford the people the human dignity so cherished by all men and
women. Health, education, property, and participation in the political process are all fundamental human rights that did not exist for
the lower strata of society in Nicaragua under Somoza.
On the other hand, the aim of the United States government to
overthrow the Sandinistas by aiding the Contra forces cannot but diminish the enjoyment of these recently acquired human rights. Civil
disruption and surprise attacks by the Contras are meant to
destabilize public and private life. For example, surreptitiously
planted explosive devices detonate in civilian surroundings killing
and maiming innocent people."
Washington appears to be as determined as ever to realize its
goal. Such resolve has led to curious results.8 6 Clearly one primary
objective has always been to portray the Contras in as favorable a
light as possible and concomitantly, to demonize the Sandinistas to
the American public, as well as to U.S. allies abroad. National Security Council officials working together with the State Department's
Latin American public-diplomacy office illegally used government
funds to disseminate erroneous news reports in order to vilify the
Sandinista government.8 7 In February 1986 CIA director William
Casey personally gave falsified data concerning the Sandinistas to a
large number of congressmen. 8 Republican Senator Durenberger felt
prompted to state that the report was "outrageous" and intended "to
portray every senator and congressman who votes against lethal [contra] aid as a stooge of communism.''89 Meanwhile, American taxpayers funded the expenses used to depict the Contras as a viable alternative leadership for Nicaragua.9 0 In order to reach an expedient end
high U.S. government officials have employed imaginative yet questionable means; the Iran-Contra scandal is but one example."1
85. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1986, at A4, col. 3.
86. Nelson & Clift, Contras Got Iran Arms Funds, L.A. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at Al, col.
5; Weintraub, Iran Payment Found Diverted to Contras, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at Al, col.
6.
87. Casey's Domestic 'Covert Op.', A PropagandaOperationRight Here at Home, Newsweek, Oct. 12, 1987, at 36.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Engelberg, Memo Details How a FrustratedReagan Pondered Ways to Get Aid to
the Contras, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1987, at 7, cols. 1-6. See also N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987, at Al,
cols. 2-3 (excerpts from Elliot Abrams' and Albert Hakim's testimony regarding the Iran/Contra affair).
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TRENDS

On June 28, 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced a verdict in favor of Nicaragua in Nicaragua v. United
States.2 The ICJ pronounced the United States at fault on fifteen
counts of breaching international law by training and supplying insurgents in Nicaragua with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the
Sandinista government.93 Nicaragua's claim against the United States
was thus vindicated by the highest judicial authority in the international community.
The events leading up to the ICJ's condemnation of U.S. policies
may be traced to the beginning of 1981 when the Reagan Administration embarked on a foreign policy designed to regain political hegemony in Latin America." Hostile, covert military activities carried out
jointly between the United States and the Contras steadily increased,
culminating in the most volatile undertaking - the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in the spring of 1984. 9 .
Not surprisingly, Nicaragua responded by instituting proceedings
against the United States in the ICJ in April, 1984.96 Nicaragua's
complaint charged the United States with the use of force and with
intervention in Nicaragua's internal affairs, thereby violating Nicaraguan sovereignty in disregard of universally accepted principles of international law.9 7 In anticipation of Nicaragua's action, the United
States had announced a few days earlier its nonacceptance of the
ICJ's jurisdiction over disputes involving Central America.9 8 Then, a
year and a half later, the State Department announced the United
92. InternationalCourt Rules United States Actions Towards Nicaragua "Breach of InternationalLaw", 23 U.N. CHRON. 110 (Aug. 1986). See also N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at Al,
cols. 2-3. The ruling was against the Reagan Administration; it should be noted, however, that
three of the fifteen judges dissented. The American Judge, Stephen M. Schwebel, voiced strong
objections to the verdict emphasizing that the court had not grasped the breadth of Nicaragua's
involvement in El Salvador.
Nicaragua has not come to court with clean hands. On the contrary, as an aggressor,
indirectly responsible - but ultimately responsible - for large numbers of deaths and
widespread destruction in El Salvador, apparently much exceeding that which Nicaragua
has sustained, Nicaragua's hands are odiously unclean.
Id. at A4, cols. 4-6.
93. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at 4, cols. 4-6.
94. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
95. Explosion Over Nicaragua,TIME, Apr. 23, 1984, at 18.
96. 21 U.N. CHRON. 4 (1984). "Nicaragua wondered by what moral authority Mr. Reagan
could demand that Nicaragua introduce this or that political system." Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 3.
98. U.S. Voids Role of World Court, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1984, at Al, col. 2. See also
International Court of Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction, Declaration by President of the
United States, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
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States' official withdrawal from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction altogether."9 In appraising American involvement in Nicaragua, it
should be understood that Washington perceives its activities to be
legitimate and in accordance with normative requirements of international law. Specifically, the United States relies on the principle of
collective self-defense.10 0
The foundation of the international legal order envisioned after
World War II lies in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. 10 ' The Article
reads: "[aill members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purpose of the United Nations."' 1 2 The function of Article
2(4) was to establish international norms proscribing the use of force.
Later, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions in order to refine the scope of Article 2(4). The first resolution, the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations (Declaration on Friendly Relations), 03 adds an explicit interpretation to Article 2(4). It outlines conduct representing
an unlawful "threat or use of force" and specifies norms of conduct
which states must follow. 0 4 The second resolution, the Definition of
Aggression,"0 5 characterizes "aggression" as "the use of armed force
by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any manner inconsistent with the
99. U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International
Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, 85 DEP'T STATE BULL. No. 2096, at 64 (Mar. 1985).
100. See infra note 103. See also N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at 4, cols. 4-6. A majority of
the International Court Judges rejected the United States claim that it was merely acting in the
"collective self-defense" of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador because Nicaragua was aiding rebel movements in these countries. However, three dissenting judges, Judge Schwebel of
the United States, Sir Robert Jenning of Great Britain, and Judge Shigeru Oda of Japan
strongly objected to the court's verdict. In particular, they questioned the court's competence
to hear the case. Id.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
103. See Declarations on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations], reprinted in DJONOVICH XIII, UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 337
(1976).
104. The following provision is in the Declaration: "No State shall organize, assist, ferment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities towards the violent
overthrow of the regime of another state." Id. at 339.
105. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression], reprinted in DJONOVICH XV, UNITED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 392 (1984).
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Charter of the United Nations."' 6 The resolution states that a country engaging in this form of aggression breaks international law as
10 7
prescribed by the U.N.

American activities in Nicaragua seem to fall within the ambit of
Article 2(4) when analyzed according to the Article's official interpretation. The U.N. General Assembly has consistently denounced the
giving of aid to insurgents like the Contras as unlawful under principles of international law. The language in the resolutions specifically
prohibits "organizing," "assisting," or "financing," "terrorists" for
108
the purpose of aggression towards another state.
There is, however, an exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition
against force which can be found in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 0 9
Under this exception, a country may act in individual or collective
self-defense if another U.N. member nation is attacked." 0 The provision further stipulates that recourse to individual or collective selfdefense measures must be reported immediately to the U.N. Security
Council."' The U.S. has relied on this exception to explain its actions
against Nicaragua as efforts of collective self-defense in favor of El
Salvador. However, when the United States decided to use force
against Nicaragua on behalf of El Salvador the U.N. Security Council
was not informed. 1' 2 Moreover, El Salvador neither requested help,
nor reported to the U.N. Security Council the assistance it received
in the name of collective self-defense."' Without the involvement of
the U.N. Security Council the United States cannot justify its actions
under the principle of collective self-defense. It would appear, therefore, that the United States chose to pursue a policy of force rather
than to adhere to established norms of international law. This must
106.
107.
108.

109.

See generally id. at 393.
Id. at 394.
See supra note 104.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the

Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
Id., reprinted in SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 943.
110.

Id.

111. Id.
112. All discussion by the Security Council of the situation in Central America has been
at the request and initiation of Nicaragua. See 20 U.N. CHRON. 8 (1983). See also 21 U.N.
CHRON. 7 (1984).
113. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol2/iss3/2

14

NICARAGUA
& THE U.S.
1987] Dupre: Nicaragua's Right
to Self-Determination
vis-à-vis United States F

be considered especially serious since procedural steps are in place to
address conflicts between nations. As a result, American conduct has
undermined the credibility of international law.
The goal of the Contras and the United States to overthrow the
present Nicaraguan government dismisses the right to self-determination of the Nicaraguan people on the one hand, and the duty of
non-intervention on the other. It is important to note that this right
and duty must attach regardless of political and ideological convictions.' Thus, no prohibition exists in international law against a
government embracing a Marxist philosophy, as Nicaragua has done,
but such a prohibition does exist in terms of interfering with the selfdetermination of a people to choose its form of government.
U.N. Resolution 1514 invoking self-determination for all peoples
should be viewed in the context of necessary prerequisites. To begin
with, a territorial unit must exist for self-determination to apply effectively. In Nicaragua such a unit has existed for a sufficiently long
time to have molded a cohesive "self." Secondly, identification with
aggregate values must be present, so that individuals feel united in
common demands and expectations. When seventy-five percent of eligible Nicaraguans join efforts in a free election to determine their
representative government, there should be no doubt that sovereignty has been established.
VI.

APPRAISAL

For most of this century the Nicaraguan people have lived under
a military dictatorship whose policies included licentious violations of
human rights. 1 5 Since Daniel Ortega became president, considerable
strides have been made towards the attainment of basic human rights
in a democratic system. Self-determination of Nicaraguans was realized in 1984 when the people chose those representatives who hold
political office today."' The procedure of elections indicates the differences between previous and the present government administrations in Nicaragua. During the Somoza years votes traditionally were
bought with rations of rum and food. 1 7 To eradicate this practice,
the Ortega Administration adopted Article 45-b," 8 which forbids anyone from distributing alcohol, drugs, or food for the purposes of influence or propaganda." 9
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
Landau, The Way of the Sandinista, THE PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 21, 1986, at 22.
LASA REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
Id.
Id.
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After the 1984 elections a new constitution was formulated with
large segments of the population taking part in its creation. 120 Across
the country, workshops were held where different sectors of the society could voice their concerns and expectations with the new government. 121 In April 1986, two American law schools sponsored a confer-

ence in New York City to discuss a draft of the new constitution. A
multi-party delegation from Nicaragua met with 300 scholars for an
extensive debate on the draft. 122 The official enactment of the constitution took place in January 1987.123
Progress in Nicaragua has been made in many spheres. Yet, the
Ortega government has also diminished human rights. In June 1986
the government closed La Prensa, the only opposition newspaper,
and charged the editors with justifying Contra activities.' 2 However,
a country which perceives itself in a state of war cannot tolerate a
press exhorting the enemy's virtues. To illustrate this point of view,
one might imagine an American newspaper in 1942 justifying the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It is important to note here that
under the Somoza regime, the former editor of La Prensa was murdered for criticizing the president's politics.

2

5

The Ortega govern-

ment has also been discredited for forcefully relocating the Miskito
Indian tribe from its ancestral territory in Northern Nicaragua in
1981.126

In times of war, human rights violations are certain to occur, but
this fact does not absolve the Sandinistas of wrongdoing. The 1986
Amnesty InternationalReport gives data on human rights violations
in Nicaragua. 127 Political prisoners, including several defense attorneys for political prisoners, have been arrested without warrant and
held incommunicado under poor prison conditions. The detainees
were either prisoners of conscience or collaborators with armed opposition groups. Some were kept in dark isolation cells for up to a
week. 12 8 At the same time, according to the report, the Contras en120. 7 CENT. AM. UPDATE 39 (May/June 1986).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 8 CENT. AM. UPDATE 26 (Jan./Feb. 1987). See also Kinzer, Nicaragua Gets a Constitution, Opposition Tests It, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at 4, cols. 4-6.
124. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A4, cols. 1-4.
125. THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 1986, at 11.
126. 7 CENT. AM. UPDATE 39 (May/June 1986). But see Oppenheimer, Sandinistas, Miskitos to Talk Peace, Miami Herald, Oct. 3, 1987, at 14a, cols. 1-4. Rebel leaders of the Nicaraguan Indians will begin talking with the Sandinistas concerning a possible return to the Miskito
homeland in Nicaragua. Id.
127. AMNESTY INT'L REP. 1986, NICARAGUA 179.
128. Id. at 180.
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gaged in torture and hundreds of extra-judicial killings. 129 Amnesty
International also stressed its concern that the Contras' human rights
violations appeared to be expressly condoned or encouraged by the
United States government. 30
The Sandinistas' human rights violations are not consistent with
their declared goals of social justice and democracy. But it should be
emphasized here that the enumerated violations of the present Nicaraguan government pale in comparison with violations of the former
Somoza regime. 13' In regards to human rights violations perpetrated
by the Contras, the United States must be held partially accountable
as well. Without United States financial and logistical assistance the
Contras would not have much impact in Nicaragua.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Elliot Abrams, addressed the issue of human rights before the Foreign Affairs Committee in March 1986.132 He voiced concern about violations in Nicaragua by both sides. The United States, he assured the Committee,
stands by the principle of democracy and human rights and supports
33
the Contras who are "fighting for democracy and human rights."'

VII. PROJECTIONS
Considering the events of the last six years and the steadily deteriorating situation in the conflict between Nicaragua and the United
States, it would be unrealistic to expect a positive development in the
nations' relationship in the near future. The United States appears to
be locked into a position where the hoped-for victory of the Contras
is the only alternative contemplated.' So eager was the Reagan Administration to bring about its version of self-determination for Nicaraguans that it apparently circumvented U.S. law by ignoring the
Boland Amendment. 185 Many commentators believe the executive
129.
130.

Id. at 183.
Id.

131. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
132. Abrams, supra note 77.
133. Id. See also 19 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 650 (May 4, 1983) (President Reagan
called the Contras "freedom fighters"). But see PanelMember Sees Self-Defeating U.S. Policy,
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1987 at A6, cols. 1-3. Representative Hamilton, Indiana democrat and
chairperson of the House Committee on the Iran/Contra affair, commented that when the President's representative [Elliot Abrams] misleads the Congress as well as the American people the
administration's policy is bound to fail. Id.
134. Reagan's Unwaivering Commitment to the Contras 8, Washington Report on the
Hemisphere, Oct. 14, 1987 at 3.
135. Kempster, Foreign Funds for Contras Was "My Idea," Reagan Says, L.A. Times,
May 16, 1987, at Al, cols. 5-6. See also Boland Amendment, Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-618, 98 Stat. 3304.
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or by the Intelligence Authorization
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branch should be held accountable for breaking the law by its handling of the Iran/Contra affair.18
A pessimistic outlook presages an even deeper American involvement in Nicaragua with the insurrection movement. The Reagan Administration will continue to persuade Democrat leaders of both
Houses and reluctant Republican legislators, that communism in
Latin America must be kept in check with aid to the Contras. In recent American history, the anathema of communism has more than
once served to rally skeptics behind the American flag. It happened
in Guatemala in 1954 when the popularly elected Arbenz government
was overthrown in a counterrevolution orchestrated by an American
administration.1

-

7

Allegedly, the Arbenz government had been domi-

nated by communists, when in fact a small Communist party had had
138
only a minor role in the elections four years earlier.
The worst scenario in Central America would put not only CIA
operatives but also American troops into active duty on Nicaraguan
soil. In fact, an American invasion has long been feared by the Nicaraguan government. In 1984 the Sandinistas anticipated a potential
American invasion if the U.S. disapproved of the outcome of the Nicaraguan elections. For that reason the election date was moved up to
coincide as closely as possible with the United States presidential
elections. Nicaraguan leaders felt that while Americans were occupied with their own election, they would not carry out strikes against
Nicaragua. 3 9
Continued confrontation between the Sandinistas and the Contras
or American military will have serious repercussions in Nicaragua.
Already, the Contra aggression has resulted in mandatory military
conscription for sixteen to twenty-two year olds which represents a
severe drain of manpower from civilian occupations. 140 Due to the
war induced lack of resources a resurgence of several serious diseases
Act for fiscal year 1984 (Public Law 98-215) may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or
individual, except to the extent provided and under the terms and conditions specified
by House Joint Resolution 648, making continuing appropriations for the fiscal year
1985, and for other purposes, as enacted.

Id.
136. See, e.g., Tribe, Reagan Ignites a Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1987,
at A31, cols. 2-6 (Laurence H. Tribe is Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard University).

137.

GUATEMALA IN REBELLION: UNFINISHED HISTORY

45-60 (J. Fried, M. Gettleman, D.

Levenson, N. Peckenhamed ed. 1983).
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. See also supra note 73.
140. REAGAN VERSUS THE SANDINISTAS, THE UNDECLARED WAR ON NICARAGUA 256-257 (T.
Walker ed. 1987).
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has inflicted immense suffering on the Nicaraguan population."'
Should unfavorable living conditions continue, popular support for
the government could wane. The Sandinistas might then resort to autocratic measures to control the people. The present pluralistic society would disintegrate and fundamental human rights would again be
suppressed.
Yet, under more favorable conditions a very different script could
evolve. An optimistic view projects an extricating of American resources from Nicaragua. This would occur if Congress no longer appropriated millions of dollars for Contra aid. Recurring disclosures of
improper government conduct in the Contra affair may sway the Legislature to take a strong stand and to demand American disentanglement. Heightened concern of the American public over large-scale involvement in the insurgency movement could result in more and
more letters to Washington lawmakers encouraging them to withdraw
Contra support. Also, the prospect of an even larger budget deficit
might make additional Contra aid unfeasible. If one assumes, arguendo, this development in the political arena, the impact on the Contra movement would be decisive.
Without United States financial and military assistance, the Contras' operation cannot sustain itself. The Nicaraguan people would be
spared the demoralizing and costly burden of continued military incursions. Life in Nicaragua would be normalized with a socio-economic infrastructure that secures to each citizen the fundamental
prerequisites for human dignity. Thus a forum would be set up in
Nicaragua where the results of an electorate's self-determination are
not questioned, but instead are recognized throughout the Western
Hemisphere including the United States.

VIII.

ALTERNATIVES

In light of the recent condemnation by the ICJ of American activities in and against Nicaragua, the United States should reappraise
its role in the world community. In its decision the ICJ postponed
assessing damages against the United States in order to give the
United States and Nicaragua a chance to negotiate a settlement.1 4 2
This avenue presents an opportunity to initiate bilateral talks with
the Sandinista government. In the alternative, specific regional
peace-keeping procedures could provide the means to reduce American involvement in the insurgency movement in Nicaragua. The recent peace plan initiative of Costa Rican president Arias raises justi141.
142.

Id.
See supra note 92.
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fled hopes for a political solution to the conflict.1"' The task of
achieving a reconciliation between the United States and the
Sandinista government appears to be overwhelmingly difficult. However, at the same time the present climate of East-West relations
makes a rapprochement between the United States and Nicaragua an
urgent necessity.
Among the many obstacles to a solution is, of course, the American concern that Nicaragua will become a Cuban or Russian satellite.
Ironically, the possibility of this occuring is in direct proportion to
Nicaragua's fear of continued American aggression. Hence, American
activities not only violate international law, but they are also selfdefeating. At stake is a greater communist presence in Nicaragua and
further destabilization in Central America. Another aspect of the
problem is the increasing economic hardship in Nicaragua resulting
from the American trade embargo.14 4 An unmanageable economic crisis would ultimately force the Sandinista government to look for even
more aid from Cuba or the Soviet Union. It is therefore essential that
the United States begin revising its foreign policy to craft a peaceful
solution to the conflict with Nicaragua.
On an international level, the United States could take an active
step in convening a world conference of legal scholars from every major political system to work towards constructing a more flexible international legal order to deal with contemporary controversies on a
global scale. Since present international law appears inadequate to
address disputes among nations effectively, an alternative mechanism
must be developed. The ongoing power struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union, as exemplified in Nicaragua, necessitates a system of supranational norms of conduct with enforcable
checks and balances.
On a domestic level one would hope for a growing, more vocal
opposition to American involvement in Nicaragua. If the American
public has not forgotten the spectre of Vietnam, it may yet rally to
the nascent nation-wide campaign appropriately called, "Stop the
Lies About Central America. "'1 5 The campaign's goal is to discourage
Washington from spreading misinformation about Nicaragua. Without misleading reports, justification for American involvement would
lose its cogency. The Democrat Speaker of the House of Representatives, Jim Wright of Texas, writes that "the real American interests"
143. LeMoyne, Five Central American Presidents Agree on Tentative Peace Plan, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 8, 1987, at 1, cols. 4-5.
144. 6 CENT. AM. UPDATE 31 (1984).
145. Gainesville Sun, Oct. 5, 1986, at B2, cols. 1-2.
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are "that Central Americans have the right to self-determination."" 6
On a recent Public Broadcasting Service televison presentation Bill
Moyers asked: "How does it happen that to fight communism we become undemocratic?"11

7

It is hoped that the American people will not

stand by quietly while the present administration continues to jeopardize America's international prestige by imposing its own version of
self-determination on the Nicaraguan people.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Although the ICJ judgment represents a moral victory for the
Sandinista government, United States foreign policy alone will ultimately determine the outcome of the conflict between America and
Nicaragua. Self-determination such as that exercised in Nicaragua on
November 4, 1984, will prove to be a hollow right if it is overridden
by external military aggression. Still, the notions of independence
and sovereignty embodied in the principle of self-determination go to
the very core of human rights and will continue to be asserted. Thus,
even though self-determination may not be an enforceable right per
se, the Nicaraguan people appear committed to give it legitimacy
with their lives.
GABRIELE NICOLAUS DUPRE

146. Kilpatrick, Arias and Ortega talk a good peace, but ....
Miami Herald, Oct. 3,
1987, at 19A, cols. 1-5.
147. Moyers, The Secret Government, Nov. 11, 1987 (television presentation on PBS).
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